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CONDEMNATION BY NUISANCE: THE AIRPORT
CASES IN RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
By WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK

°

Who does not know Lewis Carroll's fantasy of Alice and the
Cheshire Cat? Picture the scene. Alice, because she is lost in the
wood, asks the evanescent animal directions; but, because she is
lost, Alice cannot say where she wants to go. With the mad logic
that is the delight of Carroll's readers, the cat is bound to answer,
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go."
How like this can be our perception of emerging areas of the
law, as they unfold in their long course of evolution. We are
caught up in the process and, like Alice, do not know just where
we, or the law, are trying to go. New doctrines seldom spring
forth full-blown in a single decision. Opinions are trickled out,
forming what men a generation or so later will see was a coherent
pattern; yet, the judges participating in them, and contemporary
scholars studying them, neither clearly perceive nor articulate their
fullness.' However, the pattern is there, and courts are continuing to act upon it. Finally, the insights become so numerous and
so manifest that, by dint of a pioneering analysis more or less
penetrating, the path the law has made is illumed, and we stand,
as it were, like one watching the wake of his own ship.
Of recent years, to be exact, since 1946, when United States v.
Causby' was decided, much attention has been directed to what has
been thought to be a developing area of eminent domain law.
Causby and the so-called airport cases that have followed it have
been regarded generally as stretching the concepts of "property"
and "taking." There has, however, been disagreement on just how,
and how far, these concepts have been stretched.
There would be no reason for it if our present inquiry were
limited to the airport cases, qua airport cases. United States v.
Causby and its numerous progeny 3 have already been the subjects
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver.
1. A classic example is Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285
(1892). The opinion itself evinces only a hazy notion of the exception to
the hearsay rule known as "statements of intent to do a future act." It remained for later cases and writers to attribute this doctrine to the Hiltmon
case.
2. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
3. E.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Batten v.
United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962); Hopkins v. United States, 173
F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Tex. 1959); Pope v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 36 (N.D.
Tex. 1959); United States v. 15,909 Acres, 176 F. Supp. 447 (S.D. Cal. 1958);
Wright v. United States, 150 Ct. Cl. 386, 279 F.2d 517 (1960); Matson v.
United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 225, 171 F. Supp. 283 (1959); Dick v. United
States, 144 Ct. Cl. 424, 169 F. Supp. 491 (1959); Herring v. United States,
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of scholarly outpourings to a surfeit. 4 The surprise, and the challenge, in this is that no one seems to have been motivated to
analyze the airport cases as part of a larger, developing body of
law. This may be due in part to the courts' having, in deciding
these cases, treated them pretty much as sui generis. They are not,
of course, and it shall be our task to place them among their legal
bedfellows, to locate their antecedents, to plot lines of growth, and
to extend these lines. In doing all this, we shall find there is
nothing new in principle in the airport cases: no new theoretical
problems, no new answers-only a new facade. We shall, then, be
thinking, not in terms of a group of factually similar airport cases,
but in terms of a group of theoretically similar cases that incidentally includes some, though not necessarily all, of the airport
cases.
Why even mention the airport cases as such? Of what importance are they as a class? It is this: they are the current focal
point in a process of change in which, by the interaction between
socio-economic forces and legal principles, we are apt to have a general breakthrough in an important area of eminent domain law.
While the theoretic problems are nothing new, and while the solution toward which we are trending has been reached long before
in different contexts in a few jurisdictions, there has not yet been
a general acceptance of this solution. Because the forces swirling
around the airport cases are of such strength and because the
cases are often decided at high levels of our juridical hierarchy, the
probability of a general breakthrough is greater than heretofore.
In a word, the airport cases are the spearhead of a long development that now is likely to produce general acceptance of an eminent
domain doctrine, at which previously a few courts have only nibbled.
What is this doctrine? It may be formulated as follows: gov142 Ct. Cl. 695, 162 F. Supp. 769 (1958); Highland Park, Inc. v. United
States, 142 Ct. Cl. 269, 161 F. Supp. 597 (1958); Martin v. Port of Seattle,
64 Wash. 2d 324, 391 P.2d 540 (1964); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash.
2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
4. Articles: Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective:
Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. 63;
Harvey, Landowners' Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma, 56
MICH. L. REV. 1313 (1958); Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1373
(1965).
Notes on United States v. Causby: 2 WASHBURN L. J. 272 (1963).
Notes on Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962): 42 B. U. L. REV.
565 (1962); 35 COLo. L. REV. 259 (1963); 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 803 (1962);
23 MD. L. REV. 96 (1963); 57 Nw. U. L. REV. 346 (1962); 1962 U. ILL. L. F.
274; 24 U. Prrr. L. REV. 603 (1963); 14 W. REs. L. REV. 376 (1963). Notes on
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961): 66 DICK. L.

REV. 107 (1961); 22 U. PITT. L. REV. 786 (1961).

Notes on Batten v. United

States: 29 J. Am L. & CoM. 72 (1963); 9 McGILL L. J. 246 (1963); 17 Sw.
Notes on Ackerman v.
L. J. 308 (1963); 111 U. PA. L. REV. 837 (1963).
Port of Seattle: 36 CmI.-KENT L. REV. 73 (1959); 62 W. VA. L. REV. 398
(1960). The foregoing are only a smattering of the articles and casenotes
that have been published.
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CONDEMNATION BY NUISANCE

ernmental activity by an entity having the power of eminent domain, which activity would constitute a nuisance according to the
law of torts, is a taking of property for public use, even though
such activity may be authorized by legislation. Despite occasional
judicial application of the doctrine, it has been given no name, and
we have had to find one, "condemnation by nuisance." The phrase
"nuisance condemnation" is shorter but is misleading in that it
suggests the public entity has condemned or abated a nuisance.
Eminent domain questions naturally break down into the dissection of several concepts. Paraphrasing the fifth amendment to
the United States Constitution, these concepts are "taking" of "private property" for "public use" and "just compensation." Under
some state constitutions we have to consider the "damaging" as
well as "taking" of property. Of these four or five concepts, our
present discussion is concerned with two or three, "taking," "damaging," and "property." We have to consider first whether the
interest sought to be protected by the law of nuisance, that of
freedom from unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of physical land, is, or is becoming, "property." Second, we
must determine if a nuisance-interference with it, actually a partial destruction of the interest, can be a "taking" or "damaging."
These two inquiries will provide our conceptual framework of
analysis. One of the stumbling blocks to successful understanding
of eminent domain problems has been a failure sufficiently to
conceptualize these two areas, so as to keep them separate, a fault
that even perspicacious scholars have displayed. 5 Confusion of
these concepts is especially a danger in discussing the taking of
intangible interests, such as enjoyment; hence, we shall be at pains
rigorously to fence in our concepts.
CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF "PROPERTY"

General View of "Property"
Speaking now in a context broader than that of eminent do-

main law, the word "property," used in any precise legal sense,
does not signify the physical thing. In the words of Morris R.
Cohen, "Anyone who frees himself from the crudest materialism
readily recognizes that as a legal term 'property' denotes not material things but certain rights." Though all may not agree with
this particular definition, few persons conversant with the legal
thought of the past two hundred years would contend that "property" rightly denotes the physical thing.7 The non-physical concept
5. E.g., Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41
YALE L.J. 221 (1931). This fault is particularly noticeable in Professor
Cormack's discussion of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166
(1871), appearing on pages 233-34 of his article.
6. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 11 (1927).
7. E.g., "that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world. . . ." 2 BLACKSTONE, COM-
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of property has been recognized by the highest American courts8
and is routinely inculcated upon law students.
For present purposes it is not necessary that we agree precisely
on the nature of property. It is necessary only that we make the
broad distinction between property as physical thing and property
as a group of relationships to or with respect to things and that we
accept some form-any form-of the latter as common ground.
It seems safe to proceed on the assumption we can do this.
PrimordialView of "Property" in Eminent Domain
Hohfeld observed the ambiguous character of the word "property," its capacity for denoting the physical thing or, alternatively,
legal interests pertaining to the thingY It is this unqualified ambiguous term that is used in the eminent domain clause of the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and in state
constitutions. We might expect that the word, contained in a legal
document, an organic law, and interpreted by legally trained jurists, would be given a legally accepted meaning along the lines
set out in the preceding paragraph. Yet, it was decided, in the
early cases anyway, that the word "property" was to be used in
its physical sense in eminent domain law. 10
The reason most often assigned for this was explained by
Chief Justice Gibson in Monongahela Nay. Co. v. Coons:
A constitution is made, not particularly for the inspection
of lawyers, but for the inspection of the million, that they
may read and discern in it their rights and their duties;
and it is consequently expressed in the terms that are most
familiar to them. Words, therefore, which do not of themselves denote that they are used in a technical sense, are
to have their plain, popular, obvious, and natural meaning. . . .11
The quoted passage was actually directed to a question of a "taking," but the same rationale supports the notion that property consists of physical things. Additionally, the courts advanced the
practical reason that it would impose a severe burden on condemnors if they were required to pay for "consequential" harm;
12
i.e., harm to intangible interests.
*2. E.g., "taken with its strict sense, it denotes a right- indefinite in point of user-unrestricted in point of disposition-and not restricted by regard to rights of others whose enjoyment is postponed-over
a determinate thing." 2 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE § 1051 (Campbell ed. 1878).
8. E.g., "the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the
physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it." United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
9.
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 28 (Cook ed. 1919).
10. Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. (18 Mass.) 418 (1823); SEDGWICK,
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 519 (1857).
11. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 101, 114 (1843).
12. Commissioners of Homochitto River v. Withers, 29 Miss. (7 Cush.)
21 (1855); O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. (6 Harris) 187 (1851).
MENTARiES
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It would be something of an oversimplification unreservedly
to label the physical concept of property as the "older" view. For
one thing, it has had its opponents, mostly among legal writers,
for over a hundred years. 13 For another, its influence is heavy
in at least some contemporary cases. 14 In this condition of affairs,
the most accurate description of the state of the law seems to be
that it is in a process of fluxion. The trend is away from a physical
conception of property, toward an ideal one, and we have not yet
seen the end of the process. 15 This trend is reflected in the statement of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in an eminent domain case: "[P]roperty consists not merely in its ownership and
possession but an unrestricted right of use, enjoyment, and disposal."'" Many such felicitous passages could be quoted, but the
only valid demonstration of the existence of the trend is to examine
cases, the results of which are inconsistent with any hypothesis
other than that "property" denotes non-physical interests. May we
now proceed to consider several areas of eminent domain law that
manifest this quality.
Trend Away From PrimordialView of "Property"
A considerable group of cases, traceable back roughly to the
turn of the century, have held that the right of a riparian owner
to the stream flowing past his land is an interest capable of being
condemned. What might be termed the pollution cases make up
the most numerous class of riparian cases. Typically, in an in13. 1 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN 52, 55
UTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524 (1857).

(3d ed. 1909);

SEDGWICK,

STAT-

14. E.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962) (no
property taken by noise, vibration, and smoke from airplane flights not
directly overhead); Nunnally v. United States, 239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956)
(no property taken by noise and shock from firing of naval guns); Randall
v. City of Milwaukee, 212 Wis. 374, 249 N.W. 73 (1933) (no compensation
for "consequential" harm from partial blocking of ingress and egress).
15. Nichols supports this conclusion, though his analysis suffers from
the common failure sufficiently to refine the concepts of "property" and
"taking." He takes the position that "property" is used in its non-physical
sense, so as to include such interests in land as easements and riparian
rights. 2 NiCHoLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 4-8, 16 (Rev. 3d ed. 1963). But when
he discusses the concept of "taking," he says that some cases, tending to be
older ones, have held that there must be a physical invasion of land; but
that the modern, prevailing view is that any "substantial" interference with
use or enjoyment may be a taking. Id. at 407-09. Yet, he is critical of the

proposition that governmental creation of a nuisance may constitute a
taking.

Id. at 446-51.

The problem is really not one of "taking" but of

"property." If we admit, as does Nichols, that "property" refers to intangible interests, is not the further question of a physical taking irrelevant? How can there be a physical taking of a non-physical interest? The
crucial step in analysis is to keep clear the conceptual distinction between
"property" and "taking"; the failure to purify the concepts has caused
many courts the same trouble it does Nichols.
16. Painter v. Town of Forest Acres, 231 S.C. 56, 60, 97 S.E.2d 71, 73
(1957).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

verse condemnation action, a municipality has polluted the stream
by discharging sewage from an upstream treatment plant. Some
decisions clearly spell out the theory upon which they allow the
owner recovery: that his riparian right has been interfered with or
partially destroyed and thereby condemned. 17 Other similar cases,
while putting recovery on an eminent domain ground, have not as
clearly traced the nature of the interest taken, though it can be no
One pollution decision
other than the intangible riparian right.'
speaks strangely of condemnation of market value of the land; the
result is no different than in the foregoing cases. 19
ff the pollution cases deal with the quality of riparian water,
a somewhat different kind of inverse condemnation case may be
said to deal with the quantity of water. The leading example is
United States v. Cress,'0 in which a Government dam on the Kentucky River backed water up into the tributary, non-navigable Miller's Creek, on which the plaintiff's mill was located, reducing the
flowage in the creek, so the mill wheel would not turn. The Supreme Court held the Government's acts amounted to a taking of
the right of flowage. 2 1 Somewhat similar is a Connecticut decision
that a city's polluting a stream, which effectively prevented the
plaintiff from diverting 22enough water for industrial use, was a
taking of flowage rights.
The rights in light, air, and a view have been recognized as
interests that may be condemned in certain situations. Damages
for their loss may be awarded as part of severance damages to
land not physically taken when adjoining land is physically taken
for public use.23 However, such awards are limited to those situa17. McLaughlin v. City of Hope, 107 Ark. 442, 155 S.W. 910 (1913);
Parsons v. City of Sioux Falls, 65 S.D. 145, 272 N.W. 288 (1937).
18. Clinard v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939);
Donnell v. City of Greensboro, 164 N.C. 330, 80 S.E. 377 (1913); Sheriff v.
Easley, 178 S.C. 504, 183 S.E. 311 (1936); Parish v. Town of Yorkville, 96
S.C. 24, 79 S.E. 635 (1913); Snavely v. City of Goldendale, 10 Wash. 2d 453,
117 P.2d 221 (1941).
19. Kinnischtzke v. City of Glen Ullin, 57 N.W.2d 588 (N.D. 1953).
20. 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
21. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945),

denied recovery and severely limits the Cress case. The facts are similar

except that, according to the majority's interpretation of them, flowage
was diminished only in the navigable St. Croix River, where the dam was
located, but not in the non-navigable tributary on which the plaintiff's
power plant stood. Justices Roberts and Stone, dissenting, took the position
that flowage was reduced in the tributary as well and that the facts were
in all essentials the same as in Cress. The majority claimed to limit but
not overrule Cress.
22. Platt v. City of Waterbury, 72 Conn. 531, 45 Atl. 154 (1900).
23. People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943); Village of
Port Clinton v. Fall, 99 Ohio St. 153, 124 N.E. 189 (1919); 2 NICHOLS, EMISee also Roberts v. New York
NENT DOMAIN 108-14 (Rev. 3d ed. 1963).
City, 295 U.S. 264 (1935), which reviews the history of litigation in New
York State in the 1880's, in which property owners along the New York

City elevated railroad were awarded damages for loss of light and air.
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tions in which some part of the owner's land is physically taken.2 4
This limitation is subject to the criticism that it confuses the concept of "property" with that of "taking." Though the courts have
recognized that the intangible interests in light, air, and view may
be condemned, they seem to try to impose a requirement of
physical taking. It is difficult in logic to defend, or even to conceive of, the physical taking of non-physical interests.
We should take note of a miscellaneous group of non-physical,
non-possessory interests that are subject to being taken by condemnation. United States v. Welch 25 is a leading example. The
plaintiff owned a parcel of land, the dominant tenement, to which
was annexed an easement of passage across a neighboring servient tenement. By flooding, the Government condemned the
servient tenement and severed the passageway across it, but the
dominant tenement was not physically touched. In a clear recognition of the existence of a non-physical interest, the Supreme Court
held the owner of the dominant tenement entitled to a condemnation award for his easement. Somewhat less clear recognition of
intangibles is found in those cases that have allowed lien holders 26
and holders of reversions and remainders 27 condemnation awards.
Although their interests were non-possessory at the time of taking,
they had the quality of potential physical possession.
The celebrated Supreme Court case of Richards v. Washington
Terminal Co. 28 typifies a class of cases 29 that comes very near to
recognizing the condemnability of the intangible interest with
which we are ultimately concerned, the enjoyable use of land, free
from nuisance. Richards owned residential land alongside the
tracks of a railroad that had the power of eminent domain, which
land, it is important to observe, lay near the mouth of a tunnel.
The plaintiff's theory was that his interest in enjoyment had been
partially destroyed, and so inversely condemned, by two kinds of
the railroad's activities: first, by smoke, dust, cinders, and vibrations coming onto his land at all points at which it abutted the
tracks, and second, by a concentrated blast of smoke, dust, and
cinders emitted from the mouth of the tunnel. As to the first
kind of harm, the Court denied compensation, noting that this
harm was of the kind and degree suffered by all persons along
.the: track, harm normally incident to railroading operations.
Conceding that such activity by a private defendant might have
24. Crofford v. Atlanta B.&A.R.R., 158 Ala. 288, 48 So. 366 (1908);
City of Chicago v. Webb, 102 Ill. App. 232 (1902) (dictum); Syracuse Grade
Crossing Comm'n v. M. A. Wellin Oil Co., Inc., 268 App. Div. 627, 52 N.Y.S.
2d 692 (1944).
25. 217 U.S. 333 (1910).
26. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
27. 2 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN 46 (Rev. 3d ed. 1963).
28. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
29. Citation and discussion of numerous other cases of this class can
be found in 2 NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAiN 407-14 (Rev. 3d ed. 1963).
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constituted an actionable nuisance, the decision in effect denied
the condemnability of this interest in enjoyment. But as to the
second kind of harm, the blast from the tunnel, the Court held it
to amount to a condemnation of an interest in enjoyment. This
interest the decision characterized as the right to be free from
"special and peculiar damage" of a kind not suffered generally by
those affected by the public enterprise.8 0
Thus, Richards recognizes the quality of the interest protected
by the law of nuisance, the right to be free from interference
with enjoyable use. In the law of nuisance the right is to be free
from "unreasonable" interference; 1 in the law of eminent domain,
according to Richards, the right is to be free from "special and
peculiar" interference, by which we mean something more severe
than "unreasonable." And so the condemnable interest is the same
in kind but greater in degree from that recognized in nuisance law.
The case comes that close to recognizing the doctrine of condemnation by nuisance, as that term has been used here.
Finally, in our survey of various areas of eminent domain law
in which the concept of "property" has been broadened, we should
consider the airport cases themselves. They are part of a conceptstretching process that descends from the 1922 Supreme Court case
of Portsmouth Co. v. United States.3 2 The Navy had emplaced a
coastal defense battery and fire control station on a headland and
had, on one occasion at least, fired the guns seaward over the claimant's littoral land. Relying upon Peabody v. United States,33 the
Court held the firing, and imminent threat of firing, of the guns
Imposed a "servitude" upon the plaintiff's land and so amounted to
a taking of some interest for public use. The interest taken
may be described as an aerial easement for the passage of
artillery projectiles, and the "servitude" of which the Court spoke
is the burden that easement imposes on the land below. In eminent domain language, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for
the air easement, plus severance damages for the diminution in
value of the underlying land. The property interest recognized is
an aerial easement, and, to the extent airspace may be thought of
as a non-physical substance, there is recognition of condemnation
of an intangible property interest.
The famous airport case, United States v. Causbys 4 and its
30.
31.

Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 557 (1914).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 822 (1939); PROSSER, TORTS § 88 (3d ed.

1964).
32. 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
33. 231 U.S. 530 (1913). Peabody recognized the theory applied in
Portsmouth Co. but did not itself apply it, because there had been no
continuous firing of guns nor any continuing imminent threat of it. The
same coastal artillery location was involved in both cases, but by the time
the facts arose in Portsmouth Co. the battery had been enlarged and a
fire control station added, which imposed an increased threat of firing.
34. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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following host 5 are but adaptations of Portsmouth Co. v. United
States. In place of artillery missiles flying over land, they substitute airplanes. The theory of recovery is the same; the taking of
an "avigation easement" causes severance damages to the land below. These cases, then, embody no extension of the concept of

"property" beyond that which we have seen in the Portsmouth Co.

case.
Role of the Supreme Court
We have noted, and will note again, the real possibility that,
if a breakthrough occurs in the area of condemnation by nuisance,
it will occur in the United States Supreme Court. Even at the expense of some repetition, it therefore behooves us to consider the
trends in that Court in its understanding of the concept of "property." In doing so, roughly in chronological fashion, we shall see
at work two parallel tendencies: first, a seesawing dichotomy
between the physical and non-physical concepts; and second, a
perceptible, if somewhat fitful, emergence of the latter concept.
Two pre-1900 cases, Northern Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago 6
and Gibson v. United States, 37 refused to recognize a riparian
owner's right of access to piers as a condemnable form of property. The pendulum swung in 1910 with United States v. Welch, s
the facts of which were summarized earlier.3 9 In recognizing an
easement of passage across neighboring land as a form of property,
this case is the genesis of a widening understanding of that term.
Peabody v. United States40 and its companion coastal artillery
case, Portsmouth Co. v. United States,41 involving the taking of
aerial easements, cannot be said to have further liberalized the
understanding in the Welch case as much as having confirmed its
35. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v.
15,909 Acres, 176 F. Supp. 447 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Hopkins v. United States,
173 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Tex. 1959); Pope v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 36
(N.D. Tex. 1959); Wright v. United States, 150 Ct. Cl. 336, 279 F.2d 517
(1960); Matson v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 225, 171 F. Supp. 283 (1959);
Dick v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 424, 169 F. Supp. 491 (1959) (liability
conceded by Government); Adaman Mut. Water Co. v. United States, 143
Ct. Cl. 921, 1958 U.S. & Can. Av. 479 (1958); Herring v. United States, 142
Ct. Cl. 695, 162 F. Supp. 769 (1958); Highland Park, Inc., v. United States,
142 Ct. Cl. 269, 161 F. Supp. 597 (1958). Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64
Wash. 2d 324, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), and Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55
Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960), follow Causby in part and in part go
beyond it.
36. 99 U.S. 635 (1878) (temporary blocking of riparian access by
coffer dam "consequential" injury and not taking of property).
37. 166 U.S. 269 (1897) (permanent loss of riparian access caused by
lowering of water not taking of property).
38. 217 U.S. 333 (1910).
39. See the text pertaining to note 25, supra.
40. 231 U.S. 530 (1913).
41. 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
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existence within the Court.42

A very substantial liberalization was brought in 1914 by Richards v. Washington Terminal Co." No Supreme Court case has
gone beyond its recognition that an intangible interest, which we
have called the right to be free from "special and peculiar" governmental interference with enjoyment, may be the subject of
condemnation. If one takes the next step of substituting the
the doctrine of
word "unreasonable" for "special and peculiar,"
44
condemnation by nuisance is the product.
United States v. Willow River Power Co.,4 5 a 1945 case, is this

century's only distinct indication that the Court might halt, or conceivably reverse, growth of the non-physical concept of "property." United States v. Cress46 had, in 1917, acknowledged the
condemnability of a riparian mill owner's interest in the rate of
flowage. Willow River strictly limited this interest to that of flowage in non-navigable streams and did so on a set of facts the dissenting Justices contended were indistinguishable from those in
Cress.
The so-called airport cases, United States v. Causby47 and
Griggs v. Allegheny County,48 are simply adaptations of the aerial
easement theory originally announced in the Peabody and Portsmouth Co. cases, as we have observed.48 The later cases do clarify
and amplify the theory of the earlier ones and, by applying that
theory in a new context, bespeak its current viability.
Finally, to complete our survey of the Supreme Court's role,
we ought to mention Armstrong v. United States50 and United
States v. General Motors Corp.5 1 The first of these cases established that a materialman's lien on a boat was an interest capable
of being condemned by the Government, which took title from the
builder, who defaulted in his boat-building contract. General Motors is not especially noteworthy for its holding that a corporation
was entitled to compensation for the condemnation of its leasehold; the interest is a possessory one. However, the oft-quoted
language used in its rationale may be some indication of judicial
self-awareness of the direction of the Court's labors:
The critical terms are "property," "taken" and "just com42. For an analysis of the Peabody and Portsmouth Co. cases, see notes
32 and 33, supra, and their textual referents.
43. 233 US. 546 (1914).
44. See notes 28, 30, and 31, supra, and their textual referents for
discussion of the Richards case.
45. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
46. 243 U.S. 316 (1946).
47. 328. U.S. 256 (1946).
48. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
49. The reference here is to notes 32-35, supra, and the textual discussion to which they pertain.
50. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
51. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
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pensation." It is conceivable that the first was used in its
vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing....
On the other hand, it may have been employed in a more
accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering in the
citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, the construction given the phrase has been the latter. .

.

. The con-

stitutional provision is 5addressed
to every sort of interest
2
the citizen may possess.
Conclusions on the Concept of "Property"
For most purposes in law, "property" is used in its non-physical
sense, denoting certain rights respecting things. In eminent domain law, the same term early received a more limited, more physical meaning. However, the trend has been toward a nonphysical
concept, though influences of the physcial notion are still felt in
some cases. There has in this century been recognition of the
condemnability of a number of nonphysical interests: riparian
rights, light and air, the benefit of easements across neighboring
land, aerial easements, and, of greatest interest here, an interest
in being free from "special and peculiar" interference from governmental activities.
The United States Supreme Court occupies a key position in
the development of the concept "property." Several of its cases
have become leading ones. One, Richards v. Washington Terminal
Co., has carried the concept quite far in holding that governmental
activities that impose "special and peculiar" interference with enjoyment of land are "takings." For the future, the Court stands
in a unique position to liberalize the concept further.
CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF A "TAKING"

The business now at hand is to examine the nature of the
concept of an eminent domain "taking," much in the fashion in
which we have traced that of "property." At the outset there is
one obvious difference: whereas the term "property" has significance in broad areas of law, it is possible to discuss "taking"
only within the confines of eminent domain. In this sphere, however, we shall see the term has been subject to metamorphic
pressures similar to those reshaping the concept of "property."
So, the conception of a "taking," commencing as a quite physical
one, has become less so-less so in some liberal cases, in fact, than
has "property."
PrimordialView of a "Taking"
The original interpretation of "taking" was a dualistic one.
First, there had to be a physical invasion of the condemnee's
52. United States v. General Motors Corp., supra note 51, at 377-78.
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land. Second, some part of his land had to be appropriated by
the condemnor to the public use. In the words of the Massachusetts court in the 1823 case of Callender v. Marsh, "It has ever
been confined, in judicial application, to the case of property actually taken and appropriated by the government."5
We have
previously alluded to the rationale for this view, advanced by
Chief Justice Gibson in MonongahelaNay. Co. v. Coons:
Words, therefore, which do not of themselves denote that
they are used in a technical sense, are to have their plain,
popular, obvious, and natural meaning; and, applying this
rule to the context of the Constitution, we have no difficulty in saying that the State is not bound beyond her will
to pay for 5property
which she has not taken to herself for
4
public use.

With this, the court denied the plaintiff compensation for the
flooding of his land, caused by a dam built by a corporation under
state authority.
The second aspect of this original definition, that requiring the
putting to public use, was swept away by the Supreme Court in
1871 in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,5 5 a case quite contrary to

Monongahela Nav. Co. It holds that flooding of the claimant's
land, resulting from the backwater of a dam constructed by a statefranchised company, amounted to a taking for public use. Language used by the Court in its reasoning suggests the decision
arose out of liberal notions of underlying policy:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in
construing a provision of constitutional law, always understood to have been adopted for protection and security
to the rights of the individual as against the government,
.. it shall be held that if the government refrains from
the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the
public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect,
subject it to total destruction without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it
is not taken for the public useY6
Now, Pumpelly certainly involves a physical invasion; and the
property interest affected was the physical earth. The case dispenses only with the governmental-appropriation requirement. To
this extent the courts have in the 20th century been generally
agreed; physical destruction is a taking.5 7 The prickly question
53. 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418, 430 (held, destruction of lateral support
not a taking).
54.
55.
56.
57.
erosion
(1917)

6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 101, 114 (1843).
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., supra note 55, at 177-78.
E.g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947) (flooding and
by water backed up by dam); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316
(intermittent flooding); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903)
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then becomes, to what extent has this conception in its turn been
departed from, so as to allow a taking without a physical invasion?
It is tempting to answer categorically that the courts in general
have so departed. 58 We could find support for this position in the
many cases that have done so, which we will take up next, but
other modern cases give pause. Batten v. United States,59 for
example, denied recovery for severe noise, vibration, and smoke
from jet aircraft, on the ground that there was no physical invasion of the plaintiff's land or the airspace over it. Another example is Nunnally v. United States,60 refusing on similar grounds
61
to hold that the concussion from 16-inch naval guns was a taking.
The physical-invasion idea surely is felt in such cases as these.
About as accurate a statement as we can make is that, while
there has been considerable departing from the physical viewpoint and while the trend is away from it, it still has its influence.
Significantly, as we shall see, the United States Supreme Court,
for one, has departed the physical requirement.
Departures from the Physical View of a "Taking"
The riparian-right cases, which we considered in our discussion
of "property," are a class in which no physical taking or touching
of land occurs. This is especially clear in the stream pollution
cases, in which nothing, not even the water in the stream, is
occupied or destroyed; indeed, if anything, something is added to
the water.6 2 In a sense the water and the sewage in it touches the
land; but the taking is of the interest in unpolluted water, not of
the upland. Cases in which interference with riparian rights consists of diminishing the flowage of water may seem at first blush
(flooding); Tyler v. Tehama County, 109 Cal. 618, 42 Pac. 240 (1895) (erosion by deflecting current; compensation allowed for property "damaged");
Taylor v. Mayor & Council of City of Baltimore, 130 Md. 133, 99 Atl. 900
(1917) (dictum); Hodges v. Drew, 172 Miss. 668, 159 So. 298 (1935) (overflowing sewage); Thurston v. City of St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510, 11 Am. Rep.
463 (1873) (flooding); Faust v. Richland County, 117 S.C. 251, 109 S.E. 151
(1921) (flooding); 2 NicHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN 397 (Rev. 3d ed. 1963).
58. Nichols is willing to make this statement. 2 NICHOLs, EMINENT
DOMAIN 407 (Rev. 3d ed. 1963).

59. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
60. 239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956).
61. For further evidence that the physical invasion concept still has
force, also see Randall v. City of Milwaukee, 212 Wis. 374, 249 N.W. 73
(1933) (interference with ingress and egress not a taking); Spater, Noise
.and the Law, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 1373 (1965); and Note, Eminent DomainDamages to Land Not Taken, 1960 UNIV. ILL. L. F. 313.
62. McLaughlin v. City of Hope, 107 Ark. 442, 155 S.W. 910 (1913);
Clinard v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939); Donnell
v. City of Greensboro, 164 N.C. 330, 80 S.E. 377 (1913); Kinnischtzke v. City
of Glen Ullin, 57 N.W.2d 588 (N.D. 1953); Sheriff v. Easley, 178 S.C. 504,
183 S.E. 311 (1936); Parish v. Town of Yorkville, 96 S.C. 24, 79 S.E. 635
(1913); Parsons v. City of Sioux Falls, 65 S.D. 145, 272 N.W. 288 (1937);
Snavely v. City of Goldendale, 10 Wash. 2d 453, 117 P.2d 221 (1941).
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to involve a physical taking of water; but they are not physicaldoes not own the watertaking cases, because the upland owner
63
only the intangible right of flowage.
64
When we discussed Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,

we found it recognized the taking of a property interest we called
the right to be free from "special and peculiar" governmental interference with enjoyment. 65 Analyzing now the nature of the
taking involved in Richards and cases like it,6 6 we see there is no
kind of physical taking or touching-none whatever. True, such
forces as smoke, dust, odors, noise, and vibration may be present;
but we should have to take quite an excursion in physics (or
metaphysics) to establish these disturbances as physical takings or
touchings. At any rate, the excursion would be pointless. Our
purpose here is to discover the extent to which the courts have
progressed toward recognizing the doctrine of condemnation by
nuisance. Smoke, dust, odors, noise, and vibration are the stuff
of which nuisances are made; and we need not consider whether
less physical interferences, if such could be imagined, would
amount to takings. Therefore, we may, in the context of this investigation, say that Richards entirely does away with the requirement of a physical taking or touching.
A number of jurisdictions, 6 perhaps a minority, but if so a
respectable one,6 have held that loss of lateral support, caused
by governmental activity, amounts to a taking. This provides an
example of a partial deviation from the requirement of physical
taking. The condemnor does not occupy the affected land, nor is
the governmental activity apt to touch it; however, there may well
be some physical subsidence.
The airport cases themselves, Causby69 and Griggs70 and all
63. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); Platt v. City of Waterbury, 72 Conn. 531, 45 Atl. 154 (1900) (sewage in stream reduced amount
of water available for industrial use).
64. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
65. See notes 43 and 44, supra, and the text pertaining to them.
66. See discussion in 2 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN 429-30 (Rev. 3d ed.
1963).
67. E.g., City of Newport v. Rosing, 319 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1958); Langdon v. Maine-N.H. Interstate Bridge Authority, 92 N.H. 432, 33 A.2d 739
(1943); Union Course Holding Co. v. Tomasetti Constr. Co., 184 Misc. 382,
52 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1944), afl'd, 269 App. Div. 775, 55 N.Y.S.2d 576
(1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 802, 66 N.E.2d 582 (1946) (in connection with nongovernmental functions only); In re Application of Bd. of Rapid Transit
R.R. Comm'rs, 197 N.Y. 81, 90 N.E. 456 (1909) (in connection with proprietary functions only); Kropitzer v. City of Portland, 237 Ore. 157, 390 P.2d
356 (1964); Gergen v. City of West Allis, 200 Wis. 230, 228 N.W. 117 (1929)
(alternative holding); 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 547-48 (Rev. 3d ed.
1963).
68. 2 NICHOLS, Op. cit. supra note 67, at 547.
69. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
70. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
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the others like them, 71 involve a stretching, rather than abandonment, of the physical concept of a "taking." So, too, does the
coastal artillery case, Portsmouth Co. v. United States,72 upon
which these decisions were based. Whether the object passing
over the condemnee's land is an airplane or an artillery projectile,
there is a physical invasion through the owner's airspace, in which
he has at least a qualified ownership, 73 and above his land. Causby
and Griggs speak in terms of "trespass" and taking of aerial "easements." These cases, then, constitute a liberalization of the concept of "taking," but moreso in the sense of enlarging than departing from the physical view.
To bring to a close the examples of departures from the
physical concept of "taking," let us refer to two Supreme Court
cases. United States v. Welch,74 the facts of which were recited
earlier, 75 held that the destruction of the benefit of an easement
of passage, by flooding neighboring land over which it ran, was a
taking of the benefit. Since the benefitted land was not touched,
Welch is a clear example of condemnation without any physical
taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon7 6 presents an example
that is, if anything, even clearer. Pennsylvania's Kohler Act prohibited coal mining if done in a manner to cause subsidence of
any dwelling. The coal company had, by private agreement, the
right to mine coal under a certain dwelling but was prohibited
by the act from doing so. This application of the act the Court
held violative of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, on
the ground it was an attempt to condemn property, the right to
mine coal, without compensation. Here, then, is a situation in
which, by denying an owner the occupancy and use of his property
interest, the government takes the interest without any semblance
of physical intrusion.

71. See note 35, supra, for citations to this large group of cases.
72. 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
73. Without purporting to do more than touch upon the subject, we
may note that there are several 'theories of airspace ownership. Smith v.
New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930), and Burnham
v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942), are examples of
application of the "technical trespass" doctrine. The "privileged flight"
approach is seen in Vanderslice v. Shawn, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A.2d 87
(1942). Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929 (D.C. Ohio 1930),

applies the theory that the owner has exclusive right of use to that height

which he may reasonably expect to use or occupy. The Supreme Court's
position is not clear, but it seems to have leaned toward the latter view,
having said in United States v. Causby: "The landowner owns at least as
much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection
with the land." 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946).
74. 217 U.S. 333 (1910).

75. See note 25, supra, and its accompanying text.
76. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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Role of the Supreme Court
Because of our special interest in trends in the Supreme Court,
we shall briefly underline that Court's development of the concept
of "taking." If we take a birdseye view over roughly the last hundred years, we see the Court opened the era on a note of liberality.
Toward the middle of the period, the Court faltered some in going
further, but has, in the latter half of the hundred years, pressed on
to complete abandonment of the physical concept. The result is
that the Supreme Court stands as a highly original leader in this
area of the law.
In 1871 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 7 7 holding that destruction
of land by flooding was a taking, removed the old requirement
that the condemnor had to appropriate the land to itself. This was
radical enough in its day, even to the Supreme Court, which,
around the beginning of the 20th century, seemed to have some
second thoughts about what it had done. Several cases showed a
disposition to limit Pumpelly.78 Northern Transp. Co. v. City of
Chicago,79 for instance, said Pumpelly had imposed the "extremest
qualification" upon the rule against giving compensation for "consequential" harm. But the Court never reversed
itself and has
80
always followed Pumpelly on similar facts.
Meantime, the Supreme Court was moving into areas in
which the concept of "taking" was to be vastly broadened. The
airport cases, Causby8 l and Griggs,8 2 and their precursor, the coastal artillery case, Portsmouth Co. v. United States,83 stretched the
concept to include the taking of aerial easements. At the same
time, during the 20th century, the Court was entirely abandoning
any requirement of a physical touching in Riehards v. Washington
Terminal Co., 4 United States v. Welch, 5 and Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon.8 6 Thus, the United States Supreme Court today
can be said to have departed both the early-19th-century requirements of physical invasion and of governmental appropriation.
77. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
78. Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904); Gibson v. United
States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); Northern Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 99
U.S. 635 (1878).
79. Northern Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, supra note 78, at 642.
80. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947) (flooding and
erosion); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (flooding); United
States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) (flooding).
81. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
82. Griggs v. Alleghany County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
83. 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
84. 233 U.S. 546 (1914). See notes 64, 65, and 66, supra, and their
accompanying text for analysis of this case.
85. 217 U.S. 333 (1910). See notes 74 and 75, supra, and their accompanying text for analysis of this case.
86. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See note 76, supra, and its textual referent
for analysis of this case,
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Effect of Word "Damaging" in a State Constitution.
The authorities referred to up to now have been ones interpreting the word "taking," as it is used in state constitutions or
the federal constitution. In twenty-six states of the Union, the
constitutions require compensation for "damaging," as well as for
"taking."87 This language was first used by Illinois, which amended
its constitution in 1870 to add the word "damaged" to the word
"taken," which had existed alone in the constitution of 1848. The
purpose of the amendment was to abolish the old test of direct
physical injury and so to afford compensation to persons who suffered what might previously have been labeled non-compensable
"consequential" harm.88
The general effect of having "damaging" language in a state
constitution has been to make it easier for the courts to allow compensation for non-physical interferences. 89 This is demonstrated
by cases in which compensation has been allowed for injury to riparian rights from pollution, 90 for loss of lateral support, 91 or for
air pollution.9 2 We should hasten to remind ourselves that compensation can be, and has been, allowed for these interferences
where constitutions protect only from "taking"; we have seen cases
in all these categories where this has been done. It simply is
easier for the courts to make an award where constitutions contain
87. "Damaging" or an equivalent word appears in the following state
constitutions: Alabama, art. XII, § 235 (restricts only municipal and private
corporations and individuals); Alaska, art. I, § 18; Arizona, art. II, § 17;
Arkansas, art. 2, § 22; California, art. I, § 14; Colorado, art. II, § 15; Georgia,
art. I, § III, par. I; Illinois, art. II, § 13; Kentucky, § 242 (restricts only
municipal and private corporations and individuals); Louisiana, art. I, § 2;
Minnesota, art. I, § 13; Mississippi, art. 3, § 17; Missouri, art. I, § 26; Montana, art. III, § 14; Nebraska, art. I, § 21; New Mexico, art. II, § 20; North
Dakota, art. I, § 14; Oklahoma, art. II, § 24; Pennsylvania, art. XVI, § 8
(restricts only municipal and private corporations and individuals); South
Dakota, art. VI, § 13; Texas, art. I, § 17; Utah, art. I, § 22; Virginia, § 58
(restricts only municipal and private corporations and individuals); Washington, art. I, § 16; West Virginia, art. III, § 9; and Wyoming, art. I, § 33.
88. The history and purpose of the amendment is reviewed in City
of Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161 (1888), which, under its authority, allowed compensation for flooding and loss of access.
89. Randall v. City of Milwaukee, 212 Wis. 374, 249 N.W. 73 (1933)
(dictum that compensation would have been allowed for loss of access if
constitution had said "damaging"); Selden v. City of Jacksonville, 28 Fla.
558, 10 So. 457 (1891) (dictum similar to that in preceding case); Note,
Eminent Domain-Damagesto Land Not Taken, 1960 U. ILL. L. F. 313.
90. McLaughlin v. City of Hope, 107 Ark. 442, 155 S.W. 910 (1913);
Kinnischtzke v. City of Glen Ullin, 57 N.W.2d 588 (N.D. 1953); Parsons v.
City of Sioux Falls, 65 S.D. 145, 272 N.W. 288 (1937).
91. Reardon v. City & Council of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 Pac.
317 (1885); Kane v. City of Chicago, 392 Ill. 172, 64 N.E.2d 506 (1946).
92. Donaldson v. City of Bismarck, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 808 (1942)
(ashes, smoke, gases, and odors from city dump); Aliverti v. City of Walla
Walla, 162 Wash. 487, 298 Pac. 698 (1931) (odors from sewage disposal
plant).
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the less restrictive "damaging" language. Indeed, we sometimes
find courts saying that certain interferences probably are takings,
but that they are in any event damagings.9 3
Conclusions on the Concept of a "Taking"
According to the original view, held in the early 19th century,
for a taking there had to be both a physical invasion of land and
an appropriation to public use. Since 1871 and Pumpelly v. Green
Bay Co., the appropriation requirement has been gone. Later
cases have eroded the physical-invasion requirement, though its
influence continues yet in some decisions. The erosion can be
seen, not in all jurisdictions, but in some, in cases allowing compensation for these kinds of interference: stream pollution, diminishing riparian flowage, nuisance-type activities of "special and
peculiar" severity, destruction of lateral support, aerial easements
by low overflights, destroying the benefit of easements by physically blocking them on the servient tenement, and exercises of the
police power that completely deny owners the use of their property
interests. In twenty-six states, whose constitutions allow compensation for "damaging" as well as for "taking," the courts often
find it easier to dispense with a physical-taking requirement.
Perhaps most significant, the United States Supreme Court
has gone as far as any in departing the physical viewpoint. It
has, in at least three cases, abandoned it entirely. If the Supreme
Court should choose to face up to the doctrine of condemnation
by nuisance, these three cases, United States v. Welch, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, and, most of all, Richards v. Washington
Terminal Co., would be pivotal.
CONDEINATION

By

NuisANCE:

STATE OF TE LAW

Because the theory of condemnation by nuisance is the very
ratio essendi of our investigation, we shall devote this separate
section to it. So far we have dealt with areas in which the
courts have more or less relaxed the requirements of physical
taking of physical property-have to some degree approached the
condemnation-by-nuisance theory. Now it may come as a surprise
to find that half a dozen jurisdictions have decided cases on that
basis. To be sure, the courts doing so have in the main shown a
more or less imperfect grasp of the theory, but their holdings are
inconsistent with any other. We shall refer to and distinguish
some other theories that might in certain situations be relied upon
alternatively with condemnation by nuisance.

93. McLaughlin v. City of Hope, 107 Ark. 442, 155 S.W. 910 (1913);
Parsons v. City of Sioux Falls, 65 S.D. 145, 272 N.W. 288 (1937).

Winter 1967]

CONDEMNATION BY NUISANCE

Condemnation by Nuisance
Far and away the most incisive judicial recognition of the
condemnation-by-nuisance theory is contained in the 1962 Oregon
case of Thornburg v. Port of Portland. 4 This was an inverse condemnation case, in which the plaintiff sought compensation for
noise caused by jet aircraft landing at a nearby municipal airport.
The key fact is that some of the aircraft passed, not over the plaintiff's land, but in the air alongside it; thus, no recovery could
be had under the aerial easement theory. In allowing recovery,
the court explicitly did so on the theory that noise-nuisance amounted to a taking. It is interesting to note that the Oregon constitution allowed compensation for "taking" but not for "damaging."
The language used is so precise as to leave no room for doubt on
the basis for the decision:
In summary, a taking occurs whenever government acts
in such a way as substantially to deprive an owner of the
useful possession of that which he owns, either by repeated
trespasses or by repeated nontrespassory invasions called
"nuisance." If reparations are to be denied, they should
be denied for reasons of policy which are themselves strong
enough to counterbalance the constitutional demand that
reparations be paid. None has been pointed out to us in
this case.9 5
Underlining these remarks, the court later added: "The real question was not one of perpendicular extension of surface boundaries
into airspace, but a question of reasonableness based upon nuisance
theories." 96
Cases factually like Thornburg have been disposed of on a similar theory in the State of Washington, though these decisions are
aided, to an extent that has become unclear, by the "damaging"
language in the Washington constitution.
First in point of time
was Ackerman v. Port of Seattle,"' which held fairly clearly that
direct overflights were a taking of an air easement and that other
flights passing near, but not over, the land were a damaging. The
later case, Martin v. Port of Seattle,99 muddles the distinction
previously made between taking and damaging. The trial court
had allowed compensation for overflights as a taking and for
alongside flights as a damaging. rn affirming, the supreme court
said it substantially agreed with the trial court but added, "[T]his
court will not in this case stress any of the proposed distinctions
94. 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
95. Id. at 192, 376 P.2d at 106.
96. Id. at 193-94, 376 P.2d at 107.
97. WASH. CONST.art. I, § 16.
98. 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).

Compensation was allowed

for the overflights on the theory they were takings, but denied for the

flights alongside on the ground they were only damagings, as to which the
statute of limitations was held to have run.
99. 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

between the 'taking' and the 'damaging' of a property right respecting the use and enjoyment of land."' 0 0 This and similar statements in Martin evince a willingness to go as far as the Oregon
court did in Thornburg, where only "taking" language was involved; but of course the statements were not necessary to the
decision.
Looking back beyond the airport cases, there have been a
number of decisions that have, over a period of more than fifty
years, allowed compensation on the condemnation-by-nuisance theory. We might, for convenience, label these the "sewage-disposalplant" cases, as they deal with smoke and odors from sewage disposal plants and city dumps. Remarkably, in all the spate of commentary on the airport cases, no one seems to have tied these
and the sewage-disposal-plant cases together. If we here accomplish nothing more than to show both classes to be parts of one
developing body of law, our effort will be repaid.
The sewage-disposal-plant cases are factually similar enough
that it is not necessary to detail them individually in text. Typically, a city sewage plant or dump in the vicinity of, but not
necessarily directly adjacent to, the plaintiff's land has wafted its
noxious smoke, odors, dust, or ashes, usually combinations of these,
over the plaintiff's land, with the obvious result of lessening its
enjoyment. No physical touching is present, nor do the courts try
to equate the municipal acts with touchings. The states of Kentucky,'1 1 North Carolina, 10 2 South Carolina, 03 Texas, 04 and Wash100. Id. at 313, 391 P.2d at 543.
101. City of Georgetown v. Ammerman, 143 Ky. 209, 136 S.W. 202
(1911), held that odors from a city dump next to the plaintiff's land had
created a nuisance that was a taking of property. City of Louisville v.
Hehemann, 161 Ky. 523, 171 S.W. 165 (1914), held that odors and flies from

an adjacent dump were a taking.
102. Ivester v. City of Winston-Salem, 215 N.C. 1, 1 S.E.2d 88 (1939),
held that odors, smoke, ashes, rats, mosquitoes, and other insects from a
sewage disposal plant next to the plaintiff's premises constituted a nuisance
and were a taking of property. Gray v. City of High Point, 203 N.C. 756,
166 S.E. 911 (1932), held that odors from an adjacent sewage disposal plant
were a nuisance and a taking. Dayton v. City of Asheville, 185 N.C. 12,
115 S.E. 827 (1923), held that the statute of limitations for eminent domain
actions applied to an action to recover damages for smoke, ashes, and odors
from a city incinerator next to the plaintiff's land. Hines v. City of
Rocky Mount, 162 N.C. 409, 78 S.E. 510 (1913), held that odors from a trash
dump near the plaintiff's land constituted a nuisance and a taking. The
North Carolina cases, particularly Gray and Hines, supra, are often cited
in other jurisdictions. Interestingly, the North Carolina constitution contains no provision for compensation for either a "taking" or "damaging,"
but the Supreme Court of North Carolina has allowed reparation for taking on common-law principles, aided perhaps by the eminent domain
clause of the fifth amendment to the federal constitution.
103. Derrick v. City of Columbia, 122 S.C. 29, 114 S.E. 857 (1922),
affirmed a trial court decision that odors and gases from a city slaughterhouse were a nuisance and a taking of property.
104. Brewster v. City of Forney, 223 S.W. 175 (Tex. Comm. App.
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ington'01 have allowed eminent domain compensation in cases of
this kind. Washington has done so on the theory that such acts
10 8
while the others have classicaused a "damaging" of property,
107
fied the result as a "taking."
None of the sewage-disposal-plant decisions has spelled out the
theory of condemnation by nuisance with the pains the Supreme
Court of Oregon did in Thornburg v. Port of Portland. However,
in obvious contemplation of this theory, about half the cases term
the disturbances a "nuisance.' '

08

More significant than a court's

language is the result it announces, and in this respect all the
decisions stand for the proposition that nuisance-type activities are
a taking or, in Washington, a damaging.
Decisions can be found that are factually similar to the sewagedisposal-plant cases we have discussed but are theoretically different. By way of example, the North Dakota case of Donaldson v.
City of Bismarck'0 9 and an Arkansas decision, Sewer Improvement
Dist. v. Fiscus,1 10 held that offensive odors from a dump and a

sewer, respectively, were "damagings." But the courts' reasoning
was that the degree of harm was special and peculiar to the plaintiffs. This is the Richards v. Washington Terminal Co."' doctrine,
under which the protected property interest is freedom from special and peculiar interference, not the nuisance-law standard of unreasonable interference. There are those who advocate more assiduous application of what is essentially the Richards doctrine."'
Without at all impugning their position, it should be observed that
they propose something other than the theory of condemnation by
nuisance.
1920), held that odors from a nearby sewage disposal plant caused a taking
of the plaintiff's property.
105. Aliverti v. City of Walla Walla, 162 Wash. 487, 298 Pac. 698
(1931), held that odors from a nearby sewage disposal plant amounted to
a damaging of the plaintiff's property. However, the court said that an
instruction defining "nuisance," while harmless, probably should not have
been given. Southworth v. City of Seattle, 145 Wash. 138, 259 Pac. 26
(1927), is in all essentials like Aliverti, supra, except that the court approved an instruction defining "nuisance" and repeatedly termed the odors
a nuisance. Jacobs v. City of Seattle, 93 Wash. 171, 160 Pac. 299 (1916),
held smoke, smells, ashes, and flies from a city incinerator caused a damaging of the property in the plaintiff's adjoining land.
106. See note 105, supra.
107. See notes 101-104, supra.
108. See notes 101-105, supra, where reference to each case indicates
whether the court has used the word "nuisance."
109. 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 808 (1942).
110. 128 Ark. 250, 193 S.W. 521 (1917).

111. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).

112. Murrah, J., dissenting in Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580
(10th Cir. 1962); Reed, Case and Comment, 9 McGML L. J.246 (1963); Recent Case, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 837 (1963); Note, The Causby Doctrine-Medieval Concept of the Jet Age, 2 WAsHBU , L. J.272 (1963).
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Comparisonwith the Tort Nuisance Theory
Many times it is possible to award a landowner compensation
for harm from governmental activity interchangably under the
condemnation-by-nuisance doctrine or on an ordinary theory of
tort nuisance. Ignoring for the moment the defense of governmental immunity, a government entity that perpetrates a nuisance
is liable for tort damages; many cases have so held. The largest
class has been those decisions awarding damages for odors from
sewage or garbage disposal plants. 113 Other cases have given dam11 4
ages for nuisances caused by such things as stream pollution,
low flying aircraft," 5 and railroad shops."16 No doubt the list
could be lengthened interminably, but it is sufficient to illustrate
the similarity of the tort nuisance cases to the condemnation-bynuisance onces.

If the tort nuisance theory is readily available, what then is
the utility of having a doctrine of condemnation by nuisance?
One answer is that there is a sort of governmental immunity, or a
defense very like it, available in tort nuisance actions. While governments may generally be sued in tort today, the limitation is
made in nuisance suits that no activity conducted pursuant to
legislative authority can be a nuisance." 7 Indeed, this limitation
has in several states been enshrined in statutes." 8 Of course the
very statement of the rule contains one qualification; that the activity be within the legislative authority; if it is found to be beyond
the authority, government has no immunity." 9 A larger qualifi113. Duncanson v. City of Ft. Dodge, 233 Iowa 1325, 11 N.W.2d 583
(1943); Taylor v. Mayor & Council of City of Baltimore, 130 Md. 133, 99
Atl. 900 (1917); Bacon v. City of Boston, 154 Mass. 100, 28 N.E. 9 (1891);
Newton v. City of Roundup, 60 Mont. 24, 198 Pac. 441 (1921); Kobbe v.
City of New Brighton, 20 Misc. 477, 45 N.Y. Supp. 777 (Sup. Ct. 1897);
Messer v. City of Dickinson, 71 N.D. 568, 3 N.W.2d 241 (1942); Chandler v.
City of Olney, 126 Tex. 230, 87 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Comm. App. 1935).
114. Attorney Gen. ex rel. Emmons v. City of Grand Rapids, 175 Mich.
503, 141 N.W. 890 (1913) (sewage in stream flowing by plaintiff's land);
City of Tecumseh v. Deister, 112 Okla. 3, 239 Pac. 582 (1925) (sewage in
stream flowing over plaintiff's land); City of Altus v. Smalling, 185 Okla.
601, 95 P.2d 617 (1939) (sewage polluted stream flowing over plaintiff's
land).
115. Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942) (dust
and noise from overflights); Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173
S.E. 817 (1934) (noise, dust, and apprehension from overflights).
116. Baltimore & P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317 (1883)
(noise, smoke, cinders, and odors from engine house).
117. Northern Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878);
Bennett v. Long Island R.R., 181 N.Y. 431, 74 N.E. 418 (1905); Spater,
Noise and the Law, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1373, 1382 (1965).
118. Spater, supra note 117, at 1384 n.50.
119. Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942);
Taylor v. Mayor & Council of City of Baltimore, 130 Md. 133, 99 Atl. 900
(1917); Bacon v. City of Boston, 154 Mass. 100, 28 N.E. 9 (1891); Messer v.
City of Dickinson, 71 N.D. 568, 3 N.W.2d 241 (1942).
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cation stated occasionally is that the statute may not authorize an
unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of property. 12 0
Even beyond this, some cases seem disposed to do away with
the immunity outright, either by failing to discuss the issue at
all1 21 or by pronouncing ineluctably that the enabling statute did
not authorize a nuisance. 122 Notwithstanding, governmental immunity presents a hurdle to persons seeking relief from government nuisances, a hurdle that is got around under eminent domain
theory.
There is another reason the doctrine of condemnation by nuisance has utility. It is extremely doubtful that tort nuisance actions may be maintained under the Federal Tort Claims Act, because its provisions do not apply to claims based upon the exercise
or failure to exercise a "discretionary duty." 123 A string of cases
since 1949, concerned usually with flooding caused by dams or
navigation improvements, seems to preclude tort recovery for nuisances arising out of the sort of government activities that normally produce nuisances.12 4 At the least, the maintenance of tort
nuisance actions against the federal government is under enough of
a cloud that litigants would do well to plead a "taking" in the
alternative. For us, the subject of claims against the federal government is important because of our particular interest in cases
reaching the Supreme Court.
PROJECTIONS AND PREDICTIONS
How do our accounts tally?

How does the law now stand

with respect to the eminent domain concepts of "property" and
"taking"? What is the state of the law concerning the theory of
condemnation by nuisance? Are the courts apt, in the foreseeable
future, to give general recognition to the theory? Should they?
120. Baltimore & P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317 (1883);
Attorney Gen. ex rel. Emmons v. City of Grand Rapids, 175 Mich. 503, 141
N.W. 890 (1913).
121. Kobbe v. Village of New Brighton, 20 Misc. 477, 45 N.Y. Supp.
777 (Sup. Ct. 1897); City of Altus v. Smalling, 185 Okla. 601, 95 P.2d 617
(1939); City of Tecumseh v. Deister, 112 Okla. 3, 239 Pac. 582 (1925).
122. Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942);
Taylor v. Mayor & Council of City of Baltimore, 130 Md. 133, 99 Atl. 900
(1917).
123. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680(a) (1964).
124. Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950); Cooley v.
United States, 172 F. Supp. 385 (S.D. S.D. 1959) (said Coates, supra, had
been followed or discussed in twenty-five cases and never criticized);
Avina v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Tex. 1953) (operation of
government irrigation canal discretionary function); North v. United States,
94 F. Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1950); Boyce v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 866
(S.D. Iowa 1950) (blasting channel in river discretionary function); Thomas v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo. 1949); 3 DAvis, ADimINIsTRATIVE LAW § 25.05 (1958).
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How might this occur? Let us do our best to draw out answers to
these questions.
Conclusions on the State of the Law
One has difficulty in generalizing on movements in the law
when he is emerged in the ongoing process. Within the scope of
this limitation, the evidence shows that the eminent domain concept of "property" has been increasingly understood in a nonphysical sense. The original physical notion has been eroded in
many jurisdictions in this century by eminent domain cases holding
that such interests as riparian rights, light and air, the benefit
of easements across neighboring land, and aerial easements are condemnable forms of property. Not all courts would be so liberal;
some cases still show the influence of the physical viewpoint.
Significantly, though, the United States Supreme Court has been
about as liberal as any, except for those courts that have actually
allowed recovery on the condemnation-by-nuisance theory. The
125
Supreme Court case of Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.
recognizes the landowner's right to be free from "special and
peculiar" governmental interference with the enjoyment of land
as a species of property.
Reviewing what we have seen on the concept of "taking," we
must say it, too, has come to be understood in a less physical
sense than originally. The early-19th-century view was that there
had to be a physical invasion of land, together with an appropriation to public use. Under the Supreme Court's leadership in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 2 6 the appropriation requirement gave way.

Though the physical invasion requirement still affects some decisions, inroads have been made into it in some jurisdictions in the
past fifty to seventy-five years. These jurisdictions have recognized as takings such non-touchings as stream pollution, diminishing of riparian flowage, destruction of lateral support, low aerial
overflights, exercises of police powers that completely deny the use
of property interests, and nuisance-type activities of "special and
peculiar" severity. Again, the Supreme Court has taken a liberal
stance, having in three decisions'2 7 completely abandoned a physical-taking requirement. Of these decisions, Richards v. Washington
Terminal Co. once again stands out, because it held nuisance-type
activities were a taking.
Six states have, over the period of about the last sixty years,
taken the next step beyond Richards and have allowed compensation for condemnation by nuisance. Whereas the property interest protected in Richards was freedom from "special and pecul125. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
126. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
127. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Richards
v.Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914); United States v. Welch,
217 U.S. 333 (1910).
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iar" interference with enjoyment, the protection here has been
against ordinary nuisances by governmental entities-freedom
from "unreasonable" interference. In four of these jurisdictions
the cases, generally the older ones, have dealt with odors, smoke,
and dust from sewage disposal plants and city dumps. Recent
cases in two states have involved noise from jet aircraft passing
alongside, but not over, the owner's land. Of all the condemnationby-nuisance cases, Thornburg v. Port of Portland128 must be regarded as the leading one, for it contains the clearest judicial exposition of the theory.
If a court is to employ this theory, it must have a standard
by which to gauge a "nuisance." Thornburg, referring to the Restatement of Torts, adopted the tort definition; some acceptable
definition taken from the field of tort law is the natural and logical one. In whatever senses "nuisance" has been used in tort law,
we are, in the words of the Restatement, thinking of it in the sense
1 29
of invasions of "the interest in the use and enjoyment of land."'
Further, we are thinking in terms of invasions that are continuing
or repeated over some span of time and so fall into the Restatement's classification of "intentional" invasions. 130 Our chief concern is with two elements, mixed questions of fact and law, which
the landowner must prove to establish an intentional nuisance;
first, that the harm is "substantial" and, second, that the invasion
is "unreasonable."' 31 These two elements, then, deserve a closer
examination.
When we speak of "substantial" harm, we are focusing upon
the effect a given invasion has upon the landowner-the diminution of his interest in use and enjoyment. Obviously, we mean the
harm to him must be real, not imaginary; and appreciable
enough to cause, not just a personal discomfort, but one that affects his enjoyment of the land. Moreover, we apply the standard
through the eyes of normal persons in the community, not of a
hypersensitive plaintiff. The landowner must suffer those normal
discomforts of life that persons in his place and time are wont to
endure. 13 2 To be sure, the questions to be answered in determining substantiality of harm are essentially ones of fact, and we may
128.
129.

233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).

TORTS, Scope Note to ch. 40 (1939).
1 HARPER &
TORTS 67 (1956), and PROssim, TORTS § 88 (3d ed. 1964), agree in
substance with this definition.
130. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 825(b) and Comment b. (1939).
131. Id. at § 822(b),(d) (i). Harper & James agree with the Restatement's analysis, though their terminology differs slightly. They would
require that the harm and the actor's conduct both be "unreasonable." 1
HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 68, 70-71 (1956).
Prosser would, like the Restatement, require the harm to be "substantial" and the actor's conduct to be
"unreasonable." PROSSER, TORTS 598-99, 602 (3d ed. 1964).
132. Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d 752 (1947);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 822, Comment g. (1939); PROSSER, TORTS 598-99 (3d
ed. 1964).
JAMES,

RESTATEMENT,
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expect some unevenness in the decisions. But it is clear that many
disturbances of contemporary life, the clanging streetcar, the airplane passing high above, the humming power station, or the factory whistle, for examples, do not rise to the level of actionable
interferences.
The implications for our present subject are obvious. Acceptance of the doctrine of condemnation by nuisance would not subject organs of government to claims from the citizenry at large
for every noisome activity. To be sure, some new claims would
become possible, but these would be limited by the nuisance
standard of "substantial" harm, in the face of which private defendants have managed to survive. In fact, governmental agencies
are in many instances already answerable in tort nuisance, as we
have seen.
The requirement that the invasion be "unreasonable" imposes
a heavier burden on the nuisance claimant than does the substantial-harm requirement. Here we become involved in balancing the
severity of harm over against the utility of the actor's conduct.
There is no recovery unless severity outweighs utility. Moreover,
though there was formerly disagreement on this point,' it seems
to be now accepted that we shall weigh these factors, not alone
184
from the point of view of the litigants, but of the public as well.
The court is thus concerned to some extent with the social desirability of the use and enjoyment that is diminished and the degree
to which society would protect that interest, as well as with the
severity of interference. At the other end of the scales, the court
must consider the suitability of the defendant's conduct and its
social value.
This last point deserves emphasis. A given degree and kind
of interference is less apt to be a nuisance if it emanates from
activity of high social value than if from activity of low social
value. Thus, a factor to be considered is the benefit to the community flowing from conduct of the activity. 13 5 So, if an activity
provides essential public services, gives jobs to many, or benefits
the community in a myriad of ways we might imagine, this will
militate against its causing a nuisance.
Balancing utility of conduct against gravity of harm has some
intriguing implications when governmental activity constitutes the
133. E.g., Smith, Reasonable Use of One's Own Property as a Justification for Damage to a Neighbor, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 383, 393-95 (1917).
134. DeBlois v. Bowers, 44 F.2d 621 (D. Mass. 1930); McCarty v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907); RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 826, comment b. (1939); 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 70-74 (1956);
PROSSER, TORTS 602-03 (3d ed. 1964).
135. DeBlois v. Bowers, supra note 134; Vana v. Grain Belt Supply
Co., 143 Neb. 118, 10 N.W.2d 474 (1943); McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., supra note 134; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 828, comment e. (1939); 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 71-74 (1956).
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conduct. It would seem that a given activity, when performed by
government, representing the public, might well have greater
utility than the same activity done privately. With the same legal standard applied to both, the private activity that produces a
nuisance might not, when performed by government, cause either
a nuisance or a taking of property. Results similar to that in
Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. might be obtained, though
it would be deceptive to try to rationalize Richards under the nuisance test. In enunciating a test of "special and peculiar" harm,
that case applied a standard to governmental activity different from
the nuisance standard regulating private acts.
Policy Matters
Adoption of the theory of condemnation by nuisance would
give the advantage of bringing condemnation law into harmony
with other areas of the law. If, for other purposes, freedom from
unreasonable interferences is recognized as property, it is inconsistent not so to recognize it in eminent domain. This inconsistency
is out of keeping with the movement toward removing special
governmental privileges, of which movement the general adoption
of tort claims acts is one item of evidence. Moreover, there
would seem to be a certain practical utility-call it intellectual
tidiness-in being able to draw upon the relatively large body of
nuisance law.
Condemnation by nuisance is a natural stage in the evolution
of the eminent domain concepts of "property" and "taking." We
have, if we have seen anything, seen how the courts have tended,
slowly, even painfully-but in the long view have tended-to grasp
these concepts in a non-physical sense. Since condemnation by
nuisance anticipates the end of this liberalizing process, adoption
of the theory, while it would be a sizable step for most courts
today, would not be an unnatural one; it would be in line with a
long course of development. Six states have already taken the step.
Eminent domain law exists to serve social ends. In the
broad sphere of basic fairness and social utility, is condemnation
by nuisance desirable? The argument has been made that to allow recovery in airport cases in which there is no direct overflight
would subject governments to burdensome claims.13
This can
be answered two ways. First, we have seen that existing nuisance
rules would prevent government's having to pay compensation to
the community at large. The interference must be substantial.
Gravity of harm must exceed social utility of the actor's conduct,
and governmental activities are apt to be invested with high social
utility. Therefore, to require government to pay where there is
136. Harvey, Landowners' Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilem-

ma, 56 MIcH. L. REV. 1313 (1958); Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 MIcr L.
REV. 1373 (1965).
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no direct overflight or, in a larger sense, to employ the doctrine of
condemnation by nuisance generally, would not require government to be burdened with insignificant claims. Compensation
would be recoverable only where interference was oppressive. Second, the argument against compensation poisons itself. If we follow it, we should have to say that the worse the harm, and consequently the greater the burden if government must pay, the freer
government should be from a duty to pay. Stripped to its essentials, then, the contention is really that government should be
saved from making amends for its own harm-provided it can
make this harm bad enough. More in accord with basic notions of
fairness is the proposition that, if one of two persons must suffer,
it should be the one who caused the suffering.
Beyond this, acceptance of condemnation by nuisance is consistent with the aims of basic eminent domain policy. The payment
of compensation on account of governmental activity that diminishes interests in tangible things is the law's response to a clash of
diametrically opposing claims. On government's side, something
inhering in the primacy of government indicates it must have the
power, not enjoyed by individuals, to diminish property interests.
The opposing claim, that of the owner, is the normal expectation of an owner, that his interests shall not be diminished involuntarily. So far, in the nature of the opposing claims, neither side
has claimed to pay or receive compensation. The element of compensation comes in when the law, neutral arbiter of clashing
claims, offers compensation as a compromise, the law's usual solution when a loss cannot be restored in kind. By what standard or
standards should the necessity for, and amount of, compensation be
tested?
We saw that neither government nor the owner had a primary
interest in paying or receiving compensation; this element the law
introduced. If we then ask why the law should do this, we pose a
question about underlying social, economic, and ethical purposes.
Without attempting to investigate these purposes fully, we may say
that consentaneous notions of fairness give rise to a concern for
the plight of the owner and indicate that he should be compensated
for his inevitable loss. Though acting as a neutral arbiter, the
law's initial concern in tendering compensation is with his loss,
not with other concerns, as, for instance, government's gain.
Therefore, the first question in compensation is loss, and "loss"
is equated with the question of whether compensation should be
awarded at all.
Since compensation was not the primary claim of either party,
but was offered by law as a neutral arbiter, it seems the question
of the owner's loss should be tested by neutral standards. Moreover, both parties are innocent of any culpability; there is not the
aura of wrongdoing in condemnation that there is, say, in torts.
No aspect of reward or punishment is present, which again sug-

Winter 1967]

CONDEMNATION

BY NUISANCE

gests that the entire question of compensation should be resolved
by reference to neutral standards. Thus, we see two principles that
guide us in considering the entire question of compensation: we are
concerned with the owner's loss, if any, but we are to judge loss
from a neutral point of view.
The question of compensation has two parts: whether it
should be paid at all and, if so, how much should be paid. The
question of "whether" is, within the limits of constitutional language, conditioned upon the determination of "taking" and "property." Bearing in mind that we are concerned first with loss from
an owner's point of view, we should be willing to say there has
been a taking of property whenever the party has suffered a loss
which to him, as an owner, diminishes his interest in land. Our
inquiry is broader and more basic than whether land has been
physically invaded or taken away; questions like these are beside
the point. We do have the further requirement that we test loss
by a neutral standard, which means we are not to ask simply
whether the party thinks he has suffered a loss but, rather, whether he has endured an owner's suffering in some objective sense.
Our quest for whether compensation should be paid reduces
itself to this: has the party, as a result of government activity,
been affected so that, by an objective standard, a property owner
would be justified in saying he has suffered a diminution in his
interest in land? Where can we turn to answer this question?
There are two institutions in society that would generally be recognized as providing objective answers; the law of property among
private litigants and the marketplace. It will not do to say the
standard is the law of property between condemnor and condemnee; this would be to measure a thing by itself and would not
provide an objective standard. It would be interesting to determine which of the suggested standards should be applied, for some
elements of marketplace value, light and air and a view, for examples, may not have legal value. However, the determination is not
required for our present discussion. Perhaps we should also observe that certain government activities, though falling within
to claims
takings of property under our analysis, do not give rise
3 7
for compensation, because of the nature of the activities.
Discussion of how much compensation should be paid is, of
course, not our primary concern. But it is one part of the larger
compensation question and ought to be resolved by reference to a
neutral property owner's standard of loss. The formula of "fair
market value," weighted in favor of neither condemnor nor condemnee, seems reasonably designed to attain this end. In fact, fair
137. An example is governmental destruction of a house to prevent
spread of a conflagration. Also, it has been thought by some that regulatory functions of government, though they diminish property, should
not call for compensation. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

market value is the only practically available and usable standard
that operates from a neutral point of view.
Without purporting to do more than sketch a rationale for
only portions of eminent domain law, perhaps enough has been
said to make the point relevant to discussion of the doctrine of
condemnation by nuisance. The point is simply this: "property"
in eminent domain law should mean any interest in things which
has market value or, at the least, which is legally protected among
private persons at the time and place. Whether there has been a
"taking" is to ask whether governmental activity has diminished
the market value of property thus defined. Seen in this light, attempts to deny compensation on account of no appropriation to
government use or of no physical invasion are misguided. If interference results in diminution of the value of an interest having
value in the marketplace, or at least one protected by law among
private persons-and the interest in being free from nuisance clearly seems to be such in either case-compensation should be as
readily paid as if there had been a physical appropriation or invasion.
The truth is that the capacity to do harm without physical
touching is much larger than it used to be. Jet aircraft, great
dams, huge industrial complexes, perhaps various applications of
atomic energy: these are examples of the increased potential for
more harm to more persons. Jet airplanes flying fifty feet off
the ground immediately alongside A's land can cause him more
anguish than the same craft would cause B in flying 400 feet
above his land. Yet, under Causby and Griggs3ss B might recover
for a taking of property, while, under Batten v. United States,139
A could not, and, if his claim were against the federal government,
140
probably could not recover on a tort nuisance theory, either.
Perhaps there was a time when the distinction between trespassory
and nuisance-type activities bore some reasonable relation to the
capacity for interfering with interests in land. If so, that time is
past, and today's law should comport with today's realities.
Key Role of the Supreme Court
Several reasons exist for supposing the United States Supreme
Court may play a decisive part in determining whether condemnation by nuisance will become generally accepted. In the first
place, if a breakthrough comes, the likely factual context would
be a jet aircraft case. These have had a way of gravitating toward
the Supreme Court; Causby and Griggs are the two leading cases
of this sort. So, the Court is apt to have the opportunity to face
138. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
139. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
140. See notes 123 and 124, supra, and accompanying text.
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the issue in a case in which harm is caused by alongside flights.
The Supreme Court has in fact passed by one such occasion
for facing the issue. In Batten v. United States the Tenth Circuit
held that noise, vibration, and smoke from jet aircraft were not a
taking of property, because there was no overflight and so no
"physical invasion." The Supreme Court denied certiorari.'
Even if the Court had reviewed the decision, it might have been
possible to have reversed on the authority of Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.;142 i.e., that the non-trespassory harm was of
"special and peculiar" severity. It certainly was, 14 3 and Judge
Murrah, dissenting in the Tenth Circuit, would have decided the
case on this basis. Still, the opportunity would be there in a case
like Batten to adopt the broader nuisance standard. Of course if
the Supreme Court does choose to deal with a case similar to
Batten, the severity of harm then present may not be great
enough to allow the Richards test to be used.
There are reasons for supposing also that, if the Supreme
Court does confront the condemnation-by-nuisance doctrine, it will
be more disposed than would most courts to recognize the doctrine.
Through many years the Court has been no laggard in liberalizing
the concepts of "property" and "taking." Richards v. Washington
Terminal Co. comes very close to condemnation by nuisance, and
45
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 1 44 Portsmouth Co. v. United States,14
United States v. Cress, 146 and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 7
have certainly contributed through the years to the growth of
the non-physical concepts. Full recognition of condemnation by
nuisance would require the Court to advance only a short step
beyond Richards, a step that could almost be characterized as an
adaptation of existing doctrine to present conditions, rather than
a change.
Supreme Court decisions usually have special persuasiveness,
because of the esteem in which the Court is held. In the area we
are considering, a decision would have force beyond this, for it
would be binding upon both state and federal courts. After first
stepping off in the other direction in the late 1800's, 148 the Supreme
Court has in this century firmly established that the due process
141. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
142. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
143. See Reed, Case and Comment, 9 McGnML L.J. 246 (1963), for a
graphic description of the very severe interference.
144. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
145. 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
146. 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
147. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
148. Davidson v. Board of Adm'rs, 96 U.S. 97 (1878), refused to consider the contention that a state had taken property without compensation,
on the ground that the fourteenth amendment guaranteed only procedural
due process. Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380 (1894), was
similar.
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clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees that property shall
not be taken for public use without compensation. 149 Thus, a
Supreme Court pronouncement for condemnation by nuisance
would impose it as the law for all.
Predictions
If we had literally hoped to predict the future, our witches'
brew must have included more potent stuff than a sprinkling of
cases and a dash of analysis. With our limited ingredients, the
best we can hope to do is to state some probabilities, and even
these not in the precise terms of mathematical probability but of
ordinary discourse.
It is reasonably certain that the United States Supreme Court
will be given an opportunity to entertain a case in which the issue
of condemnation by nuisance is present. This might well be a
non-overflight airport case similar to Batten v. United States. If
the Court faces the issue, a matter upon which we could only speculate, beyond saying there are strong reasons for its doing so, three
outcomes are possible. One, of course, is that the Court might do
like the Tenth Circuit did in Batten and deny recovery on account
of no physical invasion. Or perhaps the Court might allow recovery and try to fit the facts within the "special-and-peculiar"harm theory of Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. Such a result might, by stretching Richards into ill-defined dimensions, obfuscate the law and raise more questions than it put to rest.
Finally, of course, the Supreme Court might, following the lead
of a half dozen states and relying heavily upon Thornburg v. Port
of Portland,allow recovery as for a condemnation by nuisance.
The latter result is a probable one, in the sense that it would
be consistent with some very relevant phenomena. Strong policy
arguments could be made in its favor. For a century or more, the
path of eminent domain law, winding toward non-physical concepts
of "property" and "taking," has pointed at this destination. Six
states have already reached it. The Supreme Court itself has
come almost within sight of it in Richards v. Washington Terminal
Co. and has a history of liberally interpreting "property" and
"taking."
Should the Supreme Court not avail itself of the opportunity to
pass upon condemnation by nuisance, then we could not realistically look for its dramatic acceptance. State courts would have to
149. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), struck down a state statute as
denying this guaranteed right. This holding was presaged by a deliberate
but, strictly speaking, unnecessary statement in Chicago B.&Q.R.R. v. City
of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), that due process required compensation
and by somewhat weaker dictum to the same effect in Holden v. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366 (1898).
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recognize it gradually, as did Oregon in 1962,110 and this would
mean a more problematical process than would a Supreme Court
decision. All we can say is that the historical development of
eminent domain concepts points toward recognition. Assuming the
law will not remain static, a continued shift is more likely in this
direction than in the other.
The point, finally, is this: there is no assurance that condemnation by nuisance is the "wave of the future." The courts may depart the path they seem to have been following. More conceivable,
legislation may be widely adopted that will preclude use of the
doctrine. But it is more probable than not that, whether gradually
or by a binding Supreme Court decision, it will be increasingly
recognized. This would be a natural development: the elements
for growth are all there.

150.

Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).

